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Chief, Military-Economics Division, ORR

M/EB 360/63

27 August 1963

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Chief, CIA/PID (NPIC)

Comments on ORR Project No. 563835, Khrushchev's Miscalculated Risk

This document is accurate and well written. The information therein is set forth in a manner holding closely to determinations derived from photography in the Fall of 1962.

In a hurried appraisal of the paper only one item was noted that was inconsistent with conclusions drawn through photo analysis. A statement in Part One, Section V, Subsection B (draft page 93) which pertains to the IRBM sites, indicates that the control buildings serving each pair of launch pads is bunkered. These control buildings were at no time bunkered and were, in fact, not completely enclosed structures when completed. A description of these control buildings as determined by photography is as follows:

A semi-enclosed rectangular structure measuring approximately [redacted] feet and constructed of prefabricated concrete sections. It is entirely open at one end, allowing ready access for vehicles and it is also open around the top of the entire perimeter of the three concrete block walls, probably to facilitate ventilation.

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a. COMOR, on the day prior to beginning the scan of a specific mission, could provide NPIC with an agreed short list of current first-priority requirements. The criteria for selecting such requirements should be flexible from mission to mission, but they obviously should concern activities on which we have pressing needs for intelligence at that time and should not be restricted to places and activities in the COMOR list.

b. COMOR's current, first-priority requirements list for a specific mission could provide the basis for NPIC's initial scan of that mission. If relevant intelligence is detected, NPIC should immediately develop a detailed analysis effort in each instance, resulting in early NPIC reports on the details in each case. In addition, any bonus targets developed during the scan could be given similar detailed analysis and reporting if such is requested.

5. In essence, we are recommending that an early NPIC detailed report be issued on each important intelligence item developed from a mission, and that such reporting should have priority over the OAK Report. While we recognize that this is not a simple task, we believe that the capabilities of NPIC together with its DIA and CIA components have reached the point where this is feasible. In fact, NPIC now accomplishes similar tasks for each mission in doing the early selection and analysis of briefing board items for the Director, NPIC. We know that CIA components are capable of selecting and recommending first priority requirements for each mission, and for analysis and reporting on resulting NPIC

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